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BILL O’REILLY • WAR IN IRAQ • SCHOOL VOUCHERS
FEBRUARY 2004
 The purpose of the Portland Spectator is to provide the students, faculty, and staff 
with the alternative viewpoint to the left-wing mentality forced upon all at Portland State 
University. The Portland Spectator is concerned with the defense and advancement of the 
ideals under which our great Republic was founded. Our viewpoint originates from the fol-
lowing principles: 
 Individual Liberty 
 Limited Government 
 Free Market Economy and Free Trade 
 The Rule of Law 
 The Portland Spectator is published by the Portland State University Publication 
Board; and is staffed solely by volunteer editors and writers. The Portland Spectator is fund-
ed through incidental student fees, advertisement revenue, and private donations. Our aim 
is to show that a conservative philosophy is the proper way to approach issues of common 
concern. In general the staff of the Portland Spectator share beliefs in the following: 
 -We believe that the academic environment should become again an open forum, where 
there is a chance for rational and prudent arguments to be heard. The current environ-
ment of political correctness, political fundamentalism and mob mentality stifle genu-
ine political debate. 
 -We support high academic standards. 
 -We believe that each student should be judged solely on his/her merits. 
 -We oppose the special or preferential treatment of any one person or group.
 -We believe in an open, fair and small student government. 
 -We believe that equal treatment yields inequality inherent in our human nature. 
 -We oppose unequal treatment in order to yield equality, for this violates any principle 
of justice that can maintain a free and civilized society. 
 -We oppose the welfare state that either benefits individuals, groups or corporations. 
The welfare state in the long run creates more poverty, dependency, social and eco-
nomic decline. 
 -We believe in Capitalism, and that the sole role of government in economic matters is 
to provide the institutional arrangements that allow capitalism to flourish. 
 -We do not hate the rich; we do not idolize the poor. 
 -We believe in an activist U.S. foreign policy that seeks to promote and establish free-
dom, political and economic, all around the world. 
 -We believe, most importantly, in the necessity of patriotic duty consistent with the 
preservation and advancement of our Republic. 
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PARENTHESIS
Bush’s Budget
The Bush administration released the 
fiscal year 2005 budget on February 02.  
Highlighting the budget was increased 
funding for security and anti-terrorism, 
and a confirmation of the President’s 
promise to cut the budget in half within 
five years.  In addition, 65 programs 
are to be eliminated with cuts to an 
additional 63, saving a total of 4.9 bil-
lion dollars.  The Education Department 
alone saves 1.4 billion from the elimina-
tion of 38 programs.  Maybe we could 
learn something about trimming fat 
from a budget here in Oregon.
Beyond the Call of Duty
The BBC has apologized to Prime 
Minister Tony Blair following a govern-
ment inquiry into a story it published 
concerning the suicide death of Iraqi 
weapons expert David Kelly, who was 
identified as the source for a story 
claiming the Blair had “sexed up” intel-
ligence leading up to the war with Iraq.  
Two top BBC officials have resigned, 
while radicals and conspiracy theorists 
continue to accuse the government of a 
“whitewash.”
You Gonna Eat That?
A man convicted of killing another man 
and eating his dismembered body has 
been sentenced to eight and a half years 
in prison in Germany. The court rejected 
a murder charge against Armin Meiwes, 
which carried a life sentence, as his 
victim had allegedly agreed to be killed 
and consumed. No word as to what was 
eaten for dessert.
CLINTON ON WMD’S
   "When I left office, there was a substantial amount of 
biological and chemical material unaccounted for. That 
is, at the end of the first Gulf War, we knew what he 
had. We knew what was destroyed in all the inspection 
processes and that was a lot. And then we bombed with 
the British for four days in 1998. We might have gotten 
it all; we might have gotten half of it; we might have got-
ten none of it. But we didn't know. So I thought it was 
prudent for the president to go to the U.N. and for the 
U.N. to say you got to let these inspectors in, and this 
time if you don't cooperate the penalty could be regime 
change, not just continued sanctions “
                                                                -Bill Clinton, July 22, 2003
“   [T]he Male Belief System, that compartmentalized, hierarchical, ejaculatory, 
andocentric power structure that is Patriarchy, is fatal to the hearts of men, to 
empathy and relationship.... That's why V-Day, The White House Project and their 
many allies are partnering to hold a national women's convention somewhere 
in the heartland, next June of 2004. Its purpose will be to inspire and mobilize 
women and vagina-friendly men around the 2004 elections and to build a new 
movement that will coalesce our energies and forces around a politic of caring.... 
This movement will be a volcano that will erupt in a flow of soft, hot, empath-
ic, breathing, authentic, vagina-friendly, relational lava that will encircle 
patriarchy and smother it. We will be the flood and we'll be Noah's arc. "V" for 
Vagina, for vote, for victory.”
                                                                 “Hanoi” Jane Fonda 
portlandspectator.com
ON GENDER RELATIONS
“  David Kay's testimony should put to rest any doubts that the Bush 
administration "sexed up" intelligence or pressured analysts to reach 
conclusions to fit any political agenda. Kay is unequivocal on this point, 
saying "never — not in a single case — was the explanation, 'I was pressured to 
do this.'" Still, dreams die hard among the Bush haters. Instead of overt pressure, 
the Left is now arguing that the personal visits by Vice President Dick Cheney 
and 
his chief of staff Scooter Libby subliminally intimidated the intelligence 
community into telling the vice president what he wanted to hear.
The critics might have a point if the Bush administration had made a case on 
Iraq that was substantially different from its predecessors. But it was nearly 
identical. In fact, in some ways the Clinton administration was even more 
alarmist on the issue than this one has been.“
                                                          -  Representative J.D. Hayworth - Arizona   
US INTELLIGENCE INQUIRY
THE “V” IS FOR VULGARITY
  “The Vagina Monologues” is back this month 
with its dry, monochrome portrayal of human 
nature.  Having lost its shock value some time 
ago, “The Vagina Monologues” now relies on an 
almost exclusive appeal to vulgarity.  It’s not so 
much a political statement as it is a display of 
crude, tasteless, ill-mannered performance art. 
With every skit as vulgar as the next, “The Vagina 
Monologues” is ultimately predictable, lacking 
real humanity in the area it claims to value so 
highly.  Above all else, “The Vagina Monologues” 
lacks honesty. 
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Drink Up, Calm Down
Rowdy bars in Portland may soon 
have more to worry about than broken 
bar stools and vomit on the bathroom 
floor. On February 11th, The Portland 
City Council is expected to vote on the 
“Time, Place, and Manner” ordinance. 
Under the ordinance, if a business serv-
ing alcohol generates three or more 
complaints within a month, it could be 
subject to restrictions on its hours of 
operation, and may potentially have its 
liquor license revoked.
Sympathy for the Devil
Three convicted sex offenders have been 
released from detention by a federal 
judge in Portland. The men were being 
held while awaiting deportation under 
the Operation Predator initiative aimed 
at immigrant sex offenders, which was 
launched nationwide in July 2003. 
Opponents of the operation say it “goes 
contrary to our whole system of justice.”
Calling all Republicans
Democrats hold all of Oregon’s top six 
political offices.  With three of them up 
for re-election this year, Secretary of 
State, state treasurer and attorney gen-
eral, a Republican candidate has yet to 
emerge to challenge any of them.  Given 
how our state is run, and that we are a 
swing state for President Bush, a strong 
Republican presence in the state legis-
lature, as well as a strong Republican 
turnout is needed in November.  Where 
are they?
Campus Update
STUDENT GOVERNMENT 
  ASPSU elections are approaching this March and like last year, student 
government has descended into an irrelevant circus.  Commandeered by 
radicals, the Senate has effectively ceased to matter to anyone but special 
interest groups and has no tangible accomplishments under its belt.  The 
executive branch has established itself as a weak and indecisive power 
content to work only on directives handed down by its apparent conduc-
tor: the Oregon Student Association.  And the judicial branch has failed 
to establish order, choosing instead to only exacerbate the problems that 
already exist.  This year’s “Activist Judge” award goes to Matt “Madman” 
Wallace for his shameless, unethical, blind devotion to his political motiva-
tions above all else.  The only positive thing to come out of student gov-
ernment this year has been the Student Fee Committee.  Aside from their 
hard work and long hours, this body has served students by protecting 
their pocketbooks from greedy special interest groups who feel entitled to 
student money.    
  It appears that the Financial Aid Office has succeeded in a landmark sci-
entific breakthrough.  They have developed a device that can actually slow 
down time.  Unfortunately, it seems that the device has malfunctioned 
somewhere in their office and no one can find it.  It has proved to be quite 
the nuisance as what was supposed to take a few weeks is now taking 
months, sometimes exceeding entire terms.  While we are excited about 
this new breakthrough, we would also like our financial aid.  Sure, govern-
ment programs are slow, bloated and inefficient, but this is ridiculous.
SERIOUSLY, WHERE’S OUR MONEY?
  OSPIRG has been zero-funded as they continue to insist on 
their right to approximately $123,000 in student fees for a sec-
ond time.  They will probably end up getting the $21,000 they 
received last year upon appeal.  In the course of their massive 
campaign to regain their previous funding level however, a few 
things have become clear.   First: OSPIRG is not honest with 
students.  Second: they have no shame.  The issue has always 
been regarding whether or not PSU student fees should be 
funding statewide organizations when the vast majority of that 
money leaves campus.  This however, was a nonexistent issue 
as OSPIRG campaigned last spring for their “referendum” with 
slogans like “vote yes to help the hungry and homeless” and 
“help save the environment.”  
  Even earlier this year in gathering 3,000 signatures OSPIRG 
was not honest with students.  They claimed that they had been 
de-funded and unfairly targeted, (both of which are untrue) and 
made no mention of the fact that they were asking for $123,000 
in student fees, had already received $21,000, how that money 
was spent, or why their funding practices were questioned in 
the first place.  Students who were supportive of OSPIRG being 
funded had no idea they were getting that much money, and 
when informed, their faces wrinkled in puzzlement: “They get 
that much?  They should get maybe ten thousand at the most.” 
Even at their budget hearing, the students(?) they had used 
to pack to room, hold signs and wear buttons were overheard 
remarking “I don’t know why I’m here, someone just told me 
to come.”  While this kind of choreography is admirable, it did 
not change the nature of their organization or the facts of their 
budget request.  
  Presently, OSPIRG has set it sights on student government, 
seeking to attain through control of student government what 
it previously could not.  And as interesting as it is that a 501 (c) 
3 organization cannot carry on any propaganda or otherwise 
attempt to influence legislation, it is even more interesting 
to note that a number of OSPIRG leaders who hold office in 
the organization also hold public office at PSU and have been 
involved in influencing legislative outcomes all year.  Before 
examining their budget, maybe OSPIRG should examine the 
law and its status as a non-profit organization.  For next year, 
students should be prepared to tell OSPIRG a third time: keep 
our money on our campus.
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ENRONizing OSPIRG  part 3
EDITORIAL 
  Supporters of gay marriage claim that the government 
should not be concerned with the private lives of law-abid-
ing citizens – sex and marriage between consenting adults, 
they argue, has no reason to be regulated by government. The 
foundation of marriage is love, and two homosexuals are just 
as capable of loving each other as two heterosexuals. 
  On a purely emotional, abstract level this argument for gay 
marriage is convincing to the American public. After all, the 
gay lifestyle is increasingly becoming accepted as normal 
behavior in mainstream society. Whether you believe this is 
right or not, the fact is that society’s attitude toward homo-
sexuality is something that cannot be restricted by govern-
ment. Since homosexuals are just regular people, why are we 
forbidding them to marry each other?
  The Massachusetts Supreme Court, for one, does not believe 
we should. Ever since the court ruled that a ban on gay mar-
riage is unconstitutional, the country has been intensely 
debating the implications of the ruling. Most of the argu-
ments against gay marriage are based on religious codes of 
moral sexual behavior, while the arguments in support tend 
to be centered on open-minded, secular concepts of freedom. 
Both sides, unfortunately, resort to emotive squabble and 
avoid logic altogether.
  The main argument against gay marriage – “it would degen-
erate an institution our civilization is based upon” – is a joke. 
Divorce rates are tremendously high, adultery is the norm, 
and if there is any institution that is already in moral disar-
ray, it is marriage. Allowing homosexuals to legally marry 
would not degenerate marriage. It would just make it nearly 
impossible to define.
  Based upon the Massachusetts ruling, a Utah man is already 
contesting his state’s anti-polygamy laws. His reasoning is 
identical to that of pro-gay-marriage advocates: he and his 
wife, as well as the other woman he wants to marry, are all 
adults who willingly want to enter into the sanctity of mar-
riage together. It is even part of their constitutionally protect-
ed religious beliefs. What is the government’s place in con-
trolling their personal lives if they all love each other? Most 
people are opposed to polygamy, but that is because they are 
biased in their personal beliefs – and individual notions of 
morality have no place in the courtroom. Right?
  If we recognize marriage as something other than a union 
between one man and one woman, the proverbial ‘flood-gates’ 
will be open to lawsuits from people who want to engage in 
polygamy, adult incest, and every other imaginable dispute 
over the official definition of marriage. Since our society 
accepts homosexuality to a large degree, but finds these other 
behaviors to be reprehensible, the system of marriage will 
become entangled in ambiguous legalisms, all of which rely 
not on legal precedent but on the whim of what is socially 
acceptable. At this point there will be only two options: either 
discard marriage as a legal concept altogether, or allow the 
people to define it any way they want to.  No matter what that 
means.
The Debate Over Marriage
 In the not-so-distant past, U.S. involvement in the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo 
was regarded by Republicans as a “chill-
ing comedy of errors that has defined our 
foreign policy,” according to Republican 
representative Tom DeLay. Those on 
the right wing often noted with irony 
that Clinton himself had desperately 
avoided serving in Vietnam, but did 
not seem to have similar trepida-
tions about putting soldiers in harm’s 
way. 
  Conservatives such as DeLay were 
wary of the reasoning behind the 
Kosovo campaign, dismissing the 
massive Serbian ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
operation against Albanians as being 
“falsely described as a huge humani-
tarian problem, when in comparison 
to other places, it was nothing.” The 
conflict in Kosovo, like the wars in 
Bosnia and Croatia, was seen as a prob-
lem in a turbulent region on the other 
side of the world in which the U.S. had 
no business getting mixed up in.
  Liberals were far more permissive. 
Angry hordes of peaceniks were nowhere 
to be found, and media superstars kept 
oddly quiet. The violently disintegrating 
Yugoslavia didn’t pose any threat to the 
U.S., and wasn’t even suspected of pos-
sessing WMD, but the atrocities com-
mitted by President Slobodan Milosevic 
seemed to justify military action. After 
all, the U.N. indicted him on countless 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
crimes against humanity – “murder; 
torture; cruel treatment … genocide and 
the complicity in genocide….” America 
wouldn’t put up with such a maniac.
  In 2003, the situation was dramati-
cally reversed. Once again, the U.S. was 
going to war in order to end a madman’s 
brutal regime, led by a President who 
had weaseled out of fighting in Vietnam. 
This time, however, Republicans were 
staunchly in support of campaign, and 
anyone who questioned the command-
er-in-chief while American troops were 
fighting overseas was suspected of ques-
tionable patriotism, if not an all-out 
treachery. This enflamed the leftist anti-
war crowd, who were suddenly aghast 
at the prospect of the U.S. acting as 
a global policeman, and accused the 
American public of being bamboozled 
by a deceptive president. The irony was 
hardly noticed by anyone. The wars in 
the former Yugoslavia and Iraq had one 
overwhelming similarity – opposition 
to the military engagement was not due 
to a genuine distaste for war, but by 
political hostility toward the presiding 
administration. 
  During the conflict in Kosovo, as well 
as the other peace keeping missions 
in the former Yugoslavia, conservatives 
lumped the war in with every other 
gripe they had with Clinton, especially 
the Monica Lewinsky and Whitewater 
scandal, because they believed the presi-
dent to be a man of low character who 
shamelessly pandered to the interna-
tional community. Similarly, the thou-
sands of people across the U.S. who took 
to the streets protesting the invasion of 
Iraq were largely driven by their hatred 
of Bush’s policies on the environment, 
social issues, abortion, and his connec-
tion to ‘big business.’ In both cases, the 
actual war seemed like little more than 
a pretext to attack the principles, and 
oftentimes the character, of the com-
mander-in-chief. Unfortunately, in the 
process of vilifying the man behind the 
war, people lost sight of the real enemies 
of humanity – Milosevic and Hussein.
  The necessity for military action against 
Iraq, as well as Kosovo, was not as 
immediate as it was against Germany 
during World War II. Since the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, there is no 
single country in the world that can truly 
endanger the United States. Aside from 
the insidious menace of terrorism, this 
nation lacks a formidable enemy, and 
for this reason, every war it undertakes 
may seem superfluous. This incredible 
military power leaves America with 
an uncertain image of itself. Is the 
U.S. a benevolent defender of weaker 
nations or an arrogant imperialist and 
exploiter?
  The left wing and the right wing 
try to use this ambiguity for political 
polarization. Each tries to depict the 
other as irrational, even self-destruc-
tive. Currently, the extreme left’s view 
of the Bush administration, and of 
conservatives in general, is almost 
cartoonish: capitalist racists whose 
ideal world is ruled by decadent corpora-
tions. The conservative portrayal of the 
left – anti-American socialists willing to 
hand over U.S. sovereignty to the United 
Nations – is equally ridiculous. Only 
demagogues like Michael Moore and 
Michael Savage profit from this attitude. 
Splitting the country along political lines 
puts us at war against ourselves.
  The arguments against intervention 
in Kosovo – exaggerated problem, mis-
leading motives, excessive cost – have 
been adopted by the left. And conser-
vatives have recognized the value of 
‘nation building,’ an idea they once 
derided Clinton for. Perhaps this indi-
cates that the goals of this country are 
more unified than it might appear. Rifts 
between different platforms and politi-
cal conflicts are necessary and wonder-
ful consequences of a free society. But 
to understand its place in the world, 
and its responsibility, America cannot 
let its perception get clouded by purely 
partisan motivations. The opposing view 
is oftentimes not far removed from one’s 
own.
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4Foreign Policy
The political motivations behind foreign policy criticism.  by Mateusz Perkowski
Two Sides of the Same Coin
  Slobodan Milosevic     Saddam Hussein
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Since taking office three years ago Bush has frequently been the tar-get of horrific insults alluding 
to the fact that he is somehow racist 
and could care less about the poor in 
America.  Recent actions by the Bush 
administration to push school vouch-
ers through Congress have exposed that 
this argument and many of those in the 
Democratic party are a complete fraud. 
Public education in the United States 
has been nothing short of a disaster 
throughout my lifetime, and for many 
years previously.  Education specifically 
within inner cities has been the worst, 
robbing children of the tools necessary 
to succeed.  Schools in these communi-
ties have failed their students dramati-
cally and someone is finally taking action 
with a trial program of school vouchers.
  The causes for the failure of public 
schools are numerous.  In addition to 
teachers unions and occasional funding 
issues, the main problem is, most fre-
quently, uninterested parents.  The Bush 
administration has launched an all out 
assault on the education disaster, and 
for once schools are being held account-
able for how well they educate.  What 
a concept.  For some strange reason 
competition is believed to have an effect 
on the amount of effort put forward - 
capitalism at its finest. Monopolies con-
sistently provide lousy products to their 
consumers, and a monopoly is exactly 
what public education is and has been 
in this country.  Working off this crazy 
philosophy President Bush has begun to 
hold schools accountable for their effec-
tiveness and offer students the chance to 
escape these publicly 
financed failures.
  President Bush’s most recent plan has 
been to give vouchers to students who 
attend failing schools so that they may 
enroll in private schools where they will 
have a chance to succeed.  This idea 
is particularly troubling for Democrats 
since it might expose the lies they have 
been telling the poor and minorities 
that Republicans supposedly don’t care 
about them.  Virtually all of the families 
affected through school vouchers would 
be poor, working class, or minorities.
  Liberal politicians everywhere sink 
into a cold sweat with the idea that 
Republicans will be successful in this 
venture.  The thought that Democrats 
will lose their stranglehold (near 90%) 
on the African American vote is fright-
ening, and would inevitably jeopardize 
their ability to ever reclaim control of 
Congress or the White House.  The trou-
bling thing for Democrats is that polls 
show a majority of blacks support the 
idea, while the liberal politicians they 
elect are stridently against it all the 
while sending their children to elite pri-
vate schools.  The tide is slowly turn-
ing.  In addition to Dianne Feinstein 
(the California version of Hilary Clinton) 
supporting school vouchers, the leaders 
of the most troubled school system in the 
country (D.C.) are also behind the idea.
  Liberal opposition to school vouchers 
is most shocking because they spend 
at least some of their time screaming 
that “women should have the right to 
choose”.  In these instances they are 
referring to abortion, and the hypocrisy 
quickly emerges.  For some reason to 
be able to think like a liberal you must 
believe that women should have the right 
to choose whether or not their child sees 
a sharp pair of scissors and a vacuum but 
not be able to choose what school that 
child is able to attend should they avoid 
Fighting for the Right to Choose
School vouchers and the liberal hypocrisy of choice.
By Adam Wilkie
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the aforementioned procedure.
  The three primary liberal arguments 
against this proposal are ridiculous, and 
quickly evaporate upon any credible anal-
ysis.  The first argument is that it takes 
money out of public schools harming them 
even further.  This is ridiculous since from 
my experience school funding had little 
to do with the quality of the education I 
received.  In fact, the worst school district 
in the country (D.C.) spends the highest 
amount per student.  This argument is 
further weakened by the fact that  the cur-
rent bill before Congress money doesn’t 
even divert money out of public schools 
to pay the private school tuition.  In most 
other programs currently underway the 
funding comes from private foundations 
set up specifically by Republicans to pro-
vide poor minority students with a better 
education.   Yet despite having even more 
money per student to spend, Democrats 
are still opposed. I’m beginning to think 
the reason why they are so against the 
issue is because it wasn’t their idea.
  The second argument against school 
vouchers is the argument for the sepa-
ration of church and state.  This argu-
ment fails on the simple fact that not all 
private schools are religious.  It is true 
that most are, but it is in no way a requi-
site for participation in the program.  If 
school voucher programs became wide-
spread there could potentially be numer-
ous schools opened specifically to serve 
voucher students with no religious theme 
whatsoever. This argument was quickly 
abandoned by the left as they realized that 
it lacked any credibility.
  The final argument revolves around 
the success of the trial programs and the 
historical performance of private schools. 
Liberals like to argue that private schools 
churn out better students because they 
only accept exceptional students to begin 
with.  Trial programs have shown that 
regardless of the prior ability of the stu-
dent, there was dramatic improvement 
after only a short time in the private 
school.  Low income students have the 
ability to show even more improvement in 
such a setting due to the “catch up” effect. 
For example, B students can only improve 
a single letter grade, while a D student has 
a lot more ground to make up.
  One beneficial side effect of a school 
voucher program is that they may final-
ly force public schools to provide the 
quality education demanded of them and 
eliminate the need for a school voucher 
program altogether.  It is appalling that 
Democrats would be against an issue that 
would provide such a benefit to so many 
poor and under-privileged children.  I 
have no doubt in my mind that Hilary 
Clinton would be leading a parade of lib-
erals to support this issue had it not been 
spearheaded by George W. Bush, but Ted 
“Chappaquiddick” Kennedy.  It is disgust-
ing, but not surprising, that Democrats 
would put their own political ambitions 
over the future of young inner city chil-
dren across America.
4Education
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Islam is a world religion with adherents far  beyond the lands of the Arabs. Moreover, between five and ten percent of Arabs are Christians, and in recent times Christian Arabs 
have played a disproportionate role in the revival of Arabic lit-
erature. It would therefore be a gross mistake to identify Islam 
with Arabic culture, or to believe that a full understanding of 
Islamic thought and politics can be obtained merely from a 
study of the Middle East. At the same time, the faith, law, and 
worldview of the Muslim diaspora directly derives from a text 
whose meaning and emotional weight is contained within its 
language, and that language is Arabic. Although there arose in 
the wake of the Koran an extraordinary civilization, and a liter-
ary and artistic culture which matched those of contemporary 
Europe, the principal source of Islamic cultural achievements 
is the single book from which the faith began.1 
  A student of Muslim thought is immediately struck by how 
narrowly the classical thinkers pondered the problems of polit-
ical order, and how sparse and theological are their theories of 
institutions. Apart from the caliphate—the office of “succes-
sor to” or “substitute for” the Prophet—no human institution 
occupies such thinkers as Al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, or Saif Ibn 
‘Umar al-Asadi for long. Discussions of sovereignty —sultan, 
mulk—tend to be exhortatory, instructions for the ruler that 
will help him to guide his people in the ways of the faith.2 
The Filasafa (i.e., thinkers influenced by Greek philosophy) 
composed their intellectual agenda by synthesizing the Koran 
with what they knew of Aristotle and Plato. But the result is a 
peculiarly frozen vision of the art of politics as the Greeks had 
expounded it. 
  Al-Farabi, for example, describes the philosopher-king of Plato 
as the prophet, lawgiver, and imam to his community, arguing 
that “the meaning of imam, philosopher, and lawgiver is one 
and the same.”3 He emphasizes the distinction between reason 
and revelation, as pondered by the contemporary Mu‘tazili 
school of theologians, who held that reason could supplement 
the revelations provided by the Prophet. And he acknowledges 
the possibility of a political system based purely on reason and 
directed to the earthly needs of the citizens. But the true sys-
tem, he insists, is founded in revelation, and directed towards 
happiness in the world to come. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) likewise 
gives precedence to revelation, and his ideal state is founded 
on prophecy and guided by the immutable shari‘a. The con-
stitution of such a state is prophetically revealed, and is “our 
Sunna which was sent down from heaven.”4 
  Law is fundamental to Islam, since the religion grew from 
Muhammad’s attempt to give an abiding code of conduct to his 
followers. Hence arose the four surviving schools (known as 
madhahib, or sects) of jurisprudence, with their subtle devices 
(hila) for discovering creative solutions within the letter 
(though not always the spirit) of the law.5 These four schools 
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(Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi and Maliki) are accepted by each 
other as legitimate, but may produce conflicting judgments in 
particular cases. As a result, the body of Islamic jurisprudence 
(the fiqh) is now enormous. Such legal knowledge notwith-
standing, discussions of the nature of law, the grounds of its 
legitimacy, and the distinguishing marks of legal, as opposed 
to coercive, social structures are minimal. Classical Islamic 
jurisprudence, like classical Islamic philosophy, assumes that 
law originates in divine command, as revealed through the 
Koran and the Sunna, and as deduced by analogy (qiyas) or 
consensus (ijma‘). Apart from these four sources (usul) of law, 
no other source is recognized. Law, in other words, is the will 
of God, and sovereignty is legiti-
mate only insofar as it reflects 
God’s will. 
  There is nevertheless one great 
classical thinker who addressed 
the realities of social order, 
and the nature of the power 
exerted through it, in secular 
rather than theological terms: 
the fourteenth-century Tunisian polymath Ibn Khaldun. His 
Muqaddimah is a kind of prolegomenon to the study of his-
tory and offers a general perspective on the rise and decline of 
human societies. Ibn Khaldun’s primary subject of study had 
been the Bedouin societies of North Africa; but he general-
ized also from his knowledge of Muslim history. Societies, he 
argued, are held together by a cohesive force, which he called 
‘asabiya (‘asaba, to bind, ‘asab, a nerve, ligament, or sinew—
cf. the Latin religio). In tribal communities ‘asabiya is strong, 
and creates resistance to outside control, to taxation, and to 
government. In cities, ‘asabiya is weak or non-existent, and 
society is held together by force exerted by the ruling dynasty. 
But dynasties too need ‘asabiya if they are to maintain their 
power. Hence, they inevitably decline, softened by the luxury of 
city life, and within four generations will be conquered by out-
siders who enjoy the dynamic 
cohesion of the tribe. 
  That part of Ibn Khaldun’s 
theory is still influential: Malise 
Ruthven, for example, believes 
that it casts light on the contem-
porary Muslim world, in which 
‘asabiya rather than institutions remains the principal cohe-
sive force.6 But Ibn Khaldun’s secular theory of society dwells 
on pre-political unity rather than political order. His actual 
political theory is far more Islamic in tone. He introduces a 
distinction between two kinds of government—that founded 
on religion (siyasa diniya) and that founded on reason (siyasa 
‘aqliya).7 The second form of government is more political and 
less theocratic, since its laws do not rest on divine authority 
but on rational principles that can be understood and accepted 
without the benefit of faith. But Ibn Khaldun finds himself 
unable to approve of this form of politics. Secular law, he 
argues, leads to a decline of ‘asabiya. Moreover the impedi-
ment (wazi‘) that constrains us to abide by the law is, in the 
rational state, merely external. In the state founded on the 
shari‘a this impediment is internal, operating directly on the 
will of the subject. In short, the emergence of secular politics 
from the prophetic community is a sign not of civilized prog-
ress but of moral decline. 
  In fact, Ibn Khaldun is rare among Muslim philosophers in 
seeing the political as a separate form of human life, with its 
own laws (qawanin siyasiya), aspirations, and procedures. His 
bleak view of political order is due to his bleak view of the city 
generally. Without the pre-political ‘asabiya, cities inevitably 
decay. Ibn Khaldun’s underlying purpose was to distinguish the 
caliphate (khilafa), which had persisted during the reign of the 
four “righteous” caliphs, from the worldly sovereignty (mulk) 
that had gradually replaced it. 
Only the caliphate had either 
the right or the power to survive 
the collapse of earthly dynasties, 
and Muslims must work con-
stantly to restore it as the rule of 
God on earth.
  For all his subtlety, therefore, 
Ibn Khaldun ends by endors-
ing the traditional, static idea of government according to the 
shari‘a. In short, the Muslim conception of law as holy law, 
pointing the unique way to salvation, and applying to every 
area of human life, involves a confiscation of the political. 
Those matters which, in Western societies, are resolved by 
negotiation, compromise, and the laborious work of offices and 
committees, are the object of eternal decrees, either laid down 
explicitly in the holy book, or discerned there by some religious 
leader—whose authority, however, can always be questioned 
by a rival imam or jurist, since the shari‘a recognizes no office 
or institution as endowed with any independent lawmaking 
power. 
  Three features of the original message embodied in the Koran 
have proved decisive for Muslim political thought. First, the 
Messenger of God was presented with the problem of organiz-
ing and leading an autonomous 
community of followers. Unlike 
Jesus, he was not a religious 
visionary operating under an 
all-embracing imperial law, but 
a political leader, inspired by 
a revelation of God’s purpose 
and determined to assert that purpose against the surrounding 
world of tribal government and pagan superstition. 
  Second, the Suras of the Koran make no distinction between 
the public and the private spheres: what is commanded to 
the believers is commanded in response to the many prob-
lems, great and small, that emerged during the course of 
Muhammad’s political mission. Laws governing marriage, 
property, usury, and commerce occur side-by-side with rules 
of domestic ritual, good manners, and personal hygiene. The 
conduct of war and the treatment of criminals are dealt with 
in the same tone of voice as diet and defecation. The whole 
life of the community is set out in a disordered, but ultimately 
consistent, set of absolutes. And it is impossible to judge from 
the text itself whether any of these laws is more important, 
“In short, the emergence of secular 
politics from the prophetic commu-
nity is a sign not of civilized prog-
ress but of moral decline.”
“The Muslim conception of law as 
holy law ... involves a confiscation 
of the political.”
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What would it take for you to support a war? In present-ing their case to the American public and the interna-tional community, the White House willfully ignored 
CIA intelligence that told them Saddam did not pose any sort 
of imminent threat; that would have been unacceptable to their 
audience. The first justification for war was Saddam’s terror 
links. Six months after Bush’s ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech, 
no legitimate connection has been found between Al Qaeda 
and Iraq, even if Bush wants us to believe it: “we need to think 
about Saddam Hussein using Al Qaeda to do his dirty work, 
to not leave fingerprints behind” Saddam is an evil person by 
any standard, but he had nothing to do with 9/11, regardless 
of what a high percentage of Fox News viewers believe. That’s 
okay: After the initial fervor, Bush gave up on terrorism as the 
justification, citing weapons of mass destruction instead. Paul 
Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, made this clear with 
this statement he gave to the Washington Post:
  “For bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons 
of mass destruction (as justification for invading Iraq) because 
it was the one reason everyone could agree on”
  Agreed, no weapons turned up. Bush, in one of the last vol-
untary remarks on WMD he made (in May), before sweeping 
them under the rug, said “We’ll find them. It’ll be a matter 
of time to do so” Bush, at least, is clear unlike the finite time 
we gave the UN, we merely have to wait an indefinite period 
before we can find these alleged stockpiles. Rumsfeld’s com-
ments are less consistently on message:
  “We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit 
and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.”
  Sounded good, and those in opposition to the war hoped he’d 
be right, but Rumsfeld ditched his mystery reports and opti-
mism two months later:   
  “We never believed that we'd just stumble over weapons of 
mass destruction in that country”
  With the Al Qaeda link defunct and WMD postponed, the 
Bush administration had to start putting more emphasis on 
Saddam’s character to make this a moral move. But at the same 
time as losing Saddam, many Iraqis lost employment, ade-
quate food, and basic 
utilities, and are still 
without these things. 
Virtually all experts on 
the region predicted 
no real government or 
infrastructure could 
rise without a massive 
infusion of both cash 
and military manpow-
er, yet Bush steamed 
ahead. If we hadn’t 
struck, the first $87 
billion Bush asked for 
could have given full 
four-year scholarships 
to 1.6 million under-
grads, or the fiscal 
conservative could have simply shrunk the largest deficit we’ve 
had in ten years. 
  Saddam was an unfathomably horrible dictator, but greater 
atrocities are happening in the Congo and North Korea, and 
North Korea is playing with ‘nucular’ weapons. By choosing 
to attack Iraq at this time, Bush stretched our troops further 
than they have been at any time since Vietnam. If we are faced 
with another major military engagement at the moment, like 
an attack by the real terrorists, the ones who flew planes into 
the World Trade Center, there is a good chance we will not be 
able to act decisively: we’ve crippled our ability to fight what 
we rallied for. While we administer Iraq, the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda are running around relatively freely in Afghanistan. 
Because of Bushís hubris, weíve created an environment in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq where young men may grow up 
with the willingness to sacrifice their lives in order to slaughter 
innocent Americans. 
  Since the war has ended we have left ourselves militarily 
weaker than we’ve been since the debacle of Vietnam, we’ve 
given tens of billions of dollars to Halliburton, we’ve alienated 
most of the Muslim world, we’ve contributed to the destabiliza-
tion of an entire region, and we’ve had over five hundred of our 
soldiers die. We have not found weapons of mass destruction, 
significantly improved the lives of Iraqis, made clear a connec-
tion between Saddam and 9/11, or dealt with the perpetrators 
of those horrible acts, and the 
neither the administration nor 
the conservative pundits have 
justified the war. War in Iraq
CON Mike Arrington
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The most serious problem with anti-war criticism is that it reeks of political opportunism.  If everything goes wrong for America in Iraq, Democrats win big.  Their subse-
quent tone on the issue then, is not surprising.
 The three main reasons for the war in Iraq: weapons of 
mass destruction, ties to terrorism, and the morally despicable 
nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime.  Of these three, the issue 
of weapons of mass destruction is the most commonly distorted 
and misrepresented.  
The link to terror is clear as we have encountered, killed or 
captured numerous Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  The “resistance” is not 
so much an Iraqi resistance as it is a resistance of foreign fight-
ers drawn to Iraq by the U.S. presence there.  So while U.S. 
presence in Iraq has had a positive effect on Libyan dictator 
Mouammar Khadafi, and the student movement in neighbor-
ing Iran it has also acted as a magnet, making Iraq a critical 
forefront in the war on terror.
 The morally despicable nature of Saddam’s regime 
is also beyond contestation.  Opponents of the war point to a 
temporary absence of water and electricity in some areas as 
we continue to discover mass graves, torture chambers, rape 
rooms, and piles of decaying human remains.  To hear their 
version of it, Iraqis would have been better off under Saddam. 
This is how far they will go.  They need to downplay the atroci-
ties of a genocidal madman for political gain.  
 The issue of weapons of mass 
destruction therefore, is the pri-
mary target of choice for anti-war 
critics.  First, it must be remem-
bered that it was never up to us 
to find weapons of mass destruc-
tion.  In signing U.N. resolution 
1441, Saddam admitted 
to possessing weapons 
of mass destruction and 
committed to disarm. 
As Robert Kagan and 
William Kristol have 
pointed out, “Here is 
what was known by 1998 based on 
Iraq's own admissions: 
* That in the years immediately prior to the first Gulf War, 
Iraq produced at least 3.9 tons of VX, a deadly nerve gas, and 
acquired 805 tons of precursor ingredients for the production 
of more VX. 
* That Iraq had produced or imported some 4,000 tons of 
ingredients to produce other types of poison gas. 
* That Iraq had produced 8,500 liters of anthrax. 
* That Iraq had produced 500 bombs fitted with parachutes for 
the purpose of delivering poison gas or germ payloads. 
* That Iraq had produced 550 artillery shells filled with mus-
tard gas. 
* That Iraq had produced or imported 107,500 casings for 
chemical weapons. 
* That Iraq had produced at least 157 aerial bombs filled with 
germ agents. 
* That Iraq had produced 25 missile warheads containing germ 
agents (anthrax, aflatoxin, and botulinum). 
Again, this list of weapons of mass destruction is not what the 
Iraqi government was suspected of producing. (That would be a 
longer list, including an Iraqi nuclear program that the German 
intelligence service had concluded in 2001 might produce a 
bomb within three years.) It was what the Iraqis admitted 
producing. And it is this list of weapons--not any CIA analysis 
under either the Clinton or Bush administrations--that has 
been at the heart of the Iraq crisis.”
The expectation for inspectors to go to Iraq and find weapons 
of mass destruction is ridiculous.  You don’t send 100 guys into 
a desert the size of California and say “start looking.”  There 
are any number of things that Saddam could have done to the 
weapons we knew and he admitted he had.  He could have hid-
den them, destroyed them, or transported them out of country. 
It was up to Saddam to cooperate and disarm, which he clearly 
made a mockery of doing.  And let us not forget that this man 
rode his regime down in flames before fully cooperating with 
the United Nations.  Given the context of the war on terror, 
the information available, and Saddam’s covert, uncooperative 
stance, any Commander-In-Chief that  would not have taken 
us to war in Iraq 
would not have 
been doing his 
duty as President 
to protect and 
defend the United 
States of America. 
War in Iraq
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more threatening, or more dear to God’s heart than the others. 
The opportunity never arises, for the student of the Koran, to 
distinguish those matters which are open to political nego-
tiation from those which are absolute duties to God. In effect, 
everything is owed to God, with the consequence that nothing 
is owed to Caesar.
  Third, the social vision of the Koran is shaped through 
and through by the tribal order and commercial dealings of 
Muhammad’s Arabia. It is a vision of people bound to each 
other by family ties and tribal loyalties, but answerable for 
their actions to God alone. No mention is made of institutions, 
corporations, societies, or procedures with any independent 
authority. Life, as portrayed in the Koran, is a stark, unme-
diated confrontation between the individual and his God, in 
which the threat of punishment and the hope of reward are 
never far from the thoughts of either party.
  Therefore, although the Koran is the record of a political 
project, it lays no foundations for an impersonal 
political order, but vests all power and authority 
in the Messenger of God. There are no provi-
sions for the Messenger’s successor, or even for 
a priesthood. The office of imam—the one who 
“stands in front,” i.e., who leads the community 
in prayer—was assumed by Muhammad until 
the day when illness prevented him from per-
forming it and he asked his father-in-law Abu 
Bakr to perform the office in his stead. 
  It is still true that an imam has no institutional 
authority in the Sunni tradition and is merely 
a man whose personal qualities and religious 
knowledge fit him for the role. The title of Imam 
is reserved by the Shi‘ites for Muhammad’s first 
cousin ‘Ali and his descendants, who are regard-
ed as the true successors of the Prophet. But 
even in the Shi‘ite tradition, there is no conception of a priestly 
office that confers authority on the one who holds it: authority 
is bestowed directly by the power of God. This point is made 
further evident by the fact that, according to the Shi‘ites, the 
line of imams ceased after the twelfth, who is the still living 
“hidden” imam, destined to reappear in the last days as the 
mahdi or “Director,” and who, according to the Koran, will 
announce the Day of Judgment. Hence, no living cleric can act 
with any greater authority than that conferred by his own per-
sonal qualities in the eyes of God—unless he can show himself 
actually to be the hidden imam, revealed at last after centuries 
of divine displeasure, a feat which the Ayatollah Khomeini set 
out to accomplish, but with only transient success. 
  The office of caliph began as an attempt to recapture a van-
ished personal authority. Hence, caliphs repeatedly failed 
to give proof of their legitimacy, and the first three of them 
began a lengthy tradition of dying at the hands of assassins. 
Those who rule in the Prophet’s name seldom satisfy their 
subjects that they are entitled to do so, since the authority that 
is looked for in an Islamic ruler is—to use Weber’s idiom—a 
charismatic rather than a legal-rational form. Islamic reviv-
als almost always begin from a sense of the corruption and 
godlessness of the ruling power, and a desire to rediscover the 
holy leader who will restore the pure way of life laid down by 
the Prophet. There seems to be no room in Islamic thinking for 
the idea—vital to the history of Western constitutional govern-
ment—of an office that works for the benefit of the community, 
regardless of the virtues and vices of the one who fills it. 
  The reader of the Koran will be struck by the radical change 
of tone that the revelations exhibit after the Prophet has been 
forced into exile at Medina. The early Meccan Suras are short, 
intensely lyrical, and written in a free rhyming prose that 
echoes the style of the pagan poets of Muhammad’s Arabia. 
They invoke the natural world and the wonderful signs of its 
Creator, being hymns of praise to the single omnipotent God 
who speaks directly to his worshippers. They are the great 
dawn-vision of an impassioned monotheist, from whose soul 
oppressive shadows are being chased away. 
  The Medina Suras are much longer and often cantankerous. 
They deal with the trials and tribulations of leadership, and 
the revelations are often granted as concrete responses to the 
problems of communal life. Muhammad’s project is revealed 
at every step, and it is a remarkable one: to 
replace the tribal society and its pagan gods with 
a new, universal order—the Islamic umma—
founded on belief in the one true God and on 
the acceptance of his commands. To achieve this 
result Muhammad had to persuade his followers 
that he was God’s messenger; he had also to give 
proof of God’s favor by success in war. 
  Although the community at Medina had escaped 
from its persecutors, it retained a powerful sense 
of belonging elsewhere. They were al-muhajir-
oun, the ones in emigration or exile (hijrah), 
and the experience of exile is invoked again and 
again in the Islamic revivals of our times. The 
absolute tone of command of the Medina Suras 
therefore goes hand-in-hand with an intense 
nostalgia, and it is not surprising that the idea 
of pilgrimage to the distant home should have rooted itself in 
Muhammad’s mind to become one “pillar” (rukn) among the 
five that constitute the core duties of the Muslim. 
  I mention this point because it helps to explain how alien the 
Koranic vision of society is to any idea of territorial jurisdic-
tion or national loyalty. In the eyes of the Koran, the place 
where we are is not the place where we belong, since the place 
where we belong is in the wrong hands. Our law therefore 
does not issue from our present place of abode, and gives spe-
cial privileges only to the other place, which may one day be 
reconquered. This attitude greatly favors the notion of law as 
a relation between each person and God, with no special refer-
ence to territory, sovereignty, or worldly obedience. Although 
localities are of enormous importance in the Muslim world-
view it is not because they are the sources of law but because 
they are the object of law, declared holy by God in his dealings 
with mankind. A holy place is precisely one subsumed into 
the divine order of things, rather than the seat, like Rome or 
Paris, of a territorial jurisdiction. This is of great significance 
in the current conflict over Jerusalem, which for the Muslim 
is a place set apart from its earthly surroundings just as Mecca 
is set apart, scarcely belonging to the geography of the actual 
world but existing in the numinous region of divine impera-
tives. 
  After the initial turmoils—in which the conflict between 
Ibn Khaldun
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two of the righteous caliphs, ‘Uthman and ‘Ali, led to the split 
between Sunni and Shi‘ite—the Muslim dynasties gained ter-
ritory by conquest. The caliphate emerged as a genuine insti-
tution, though one increasingly deprived of political power. 
Nevertheless, the experience of settled government led to seri-
ous attempts by learned men to adapt the faith to the needs of 
government. This was the great period of the hadiths—tradi-
tions, authenticated by pious examination, which recorded 
such words and deeds of the Prophet as might offer guidance to 
a settled community. These hadiths are markedly more peace-
ful and conciliatory than the Medina Suras, and have clearly 
been shaped by the experience of a society in which charismat-
ic leadership is no longer the norm. They are an attempt to read 
back into the prophetic source of Islam the real achievements 
of Islamic forms of government. At the same time there arose 
the four schools of fiqh, which bring together the reflections 
of jurists over generations, and show the attempt by ijtihad to 
establish a genuine rule of law in places where 
law is nevertheless seen as issuing placelessly 
and timelessly from the will of God. 
  Even in that great period of jurisprudence, how-
ever, the shari‘a remained defective in the cru-
cial matter of legal personality. As Ruthven has 
pointed out, there is no provision in Islamic law 
for the corporation as a legal person, with rights 
and duties of its own.8 The city, the commit-
tee, the mosque itself, do not occur as indepen-
dent subjects of the law, and although Muslim 
countries abound in charitable foundations—the 
awqaf (singular waqf)— they are conceived not 
as property in the hands of a corporate person, 
but as property that has been simply “removed” 
from circulation or which has “ceased” (waqafa). 
In Ruthven’s words, there was no “juridical definition of the 
public sphere” in classical Islamic jurisprudence,9 a fact which 
greatly impeded the formation of a genuine political order. 
Hence “stealing from the public treasury was not held subject 
to the hadd [i.e., the divinely ordained punishment for theft], 
because the illegal act was not committed against a juristic 
agent independent of the thief who was, along with every other 
Muslim, considered part-owner of the mal Allah, and thus 
part-owner of what he had stolen.”10 
  Two momentous consequences follow from the adoption of 
the shari‘a. First, because it is a law governing only Muslims, 
the shari‘a leaves the status of other communities undefined. 
These other communities remain strictly “outside the law,” and 
must either convert or accept the status of dhimma—which 
means protected by treaty or covenant. Only “people of the 
book”—i.e., Jews, Christians, and (in Persia) Zoroastrians 
—have traditionally been accorded this status. Dhimma is 
offered in return for the payment of taxes, and grants no clear 
and justiciable rights apart from a general right of protec-
tion.11 Although free communities of Christians and Jews 
often thrived under Islamic law, there was no formal or legal 
acceptance of their right to worship in their own manner, and 
their property was subject to confiscation on more or less 
arbitrary grounds. The Turkish millet system rectified this, but 
depended for its authority on the secular rule of the sultan and 
had no authority in the shari‘a. 
  Second, the way of life that grows under the aegis of the shari‘a 
is profoundly domestic, without any public or ceremonial char-
acter except in the matter of communal worship. The mosque 
and its school or madrasah, together with the souq or bazaar, 
are the only genuine public spaces in traditional Muslim towns. 
The street is a lane among private houses, which lie along it and 
across it in a disorderly jumble of inward-turning courtyards. 
The Muslim city is a creation of the shari‘a—a hive of private 
spaces, built cell on cell. Above its rooftops the minarets point 
to God like outstretched fingers, resounding with the voice of 
the muezzin as he calls the faithful to prayer. 
  I mention these two features because they are often over-
looked, despite their enormous importance in the psychol-
ogy and the politics of the Islamic world. The Muslim city is 
explicitly a city for Muslims, a place of congregation in which 
individuals and their families live side-by-side in obedience 
to God, and where non-Muslims exist only on sufferance. The 
mosque is the link to God, and the pious believe 
that no building should overtop the minarets. 
Many a Muslim carries this image in his heart, 
and when he encounters the Western city, with 
its open spaces, its wide streets, its visible inte-
riors, its skyscrapers dwarfing the few religious 
buildings, he is apt to feel both wonder and rage 
at the God-defying arrogance that has so com-
pletely eclipsed the life of piety and prayer. It is 
not merely of anecdotal significance that, when 
the terrorist leader Mohammed Atta left his 
native Egypt for Hamburg to continue his stud-
ies in architecture, it was not to learn about the 
modernist buildings that disfigure German cit-
ies, but to write a thesis on the restoration of the 
ancient city of Aleppo.12 When he led the attack 
against the World Trade Center, Atta was assaulting a symbol 
of economic, aesthetic, and spiritual paganism. 
  Those who see religion simply as a set of doctrines concern-
ing the origin of the world, the laws that govern it, and the 
destiny of mankind will think of faith merely as a substitute for 
rational argument, destined to crumble before the advance of 
science or to persist, if at all, as a jumble of tattered supersti-
tions in the midst of a world that refutes them. But doctrine 
is the least important part of religion, as Muhammad came 
quickly to see. Communities are not formed by doctrine, but 
by obedience, and the two great instruments for securing obe-
dience are ritual and law. The Muslim faith involves constant 
rehearsal of the believer’s submission to God. The repetition of 
sacred words and formulae, the exact performance of gestures 
whose only explanation is that they have been commanded, the 
obligatory times of prayer, the annual fast and all the duties 
required by it, the dietary laws, the pilgrimage to Mecca with 
its myriad obligatory actions—all this, which is meaningless 
to the skeptical outsider, is the stuff of consolation.13 Ritual 
places individuals on a plane of absolute equality; it overcomes 
distance, extinguishes the self in the flow of collective emotion, 
and refreshes the worshipper with a sense that he has regained 
favor in God’s sight and hence his place in the community of 
believers. Ritual is a discipline of the body that conveys and 
reinforces a discipline of the soul. It is the outward manifesta-
tion of the collective act of submission (islam) that unites the 
Ayatollah Khomeini
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community of believers. And it is one undeniable source of the 
peace and gentleness of the old Muslim city. 
  In short, Islam offers an unparalleled form of membership, 
and one whose appeal is all the greater in that it transcends 
time and place, joining the believer to a universal umma whose 
only sovereign is God. Even if it may appear, to the skeptical 
modernist, as a medieval fossil, Islam has an unrivalled abil-
ity to compensate for what is lacking in modern experience. It 
rationalizes and validates the condition of exile: the condition 
in which we all find ourselves, severed by the hectic motion of 
mechanized life from the archaic need 
for membership. Nothing evokes this 
more clearly than the collective rite in 
which the faithful turn to Mecca with 
their prayers—projecting their submis-
sion and their longing away from the 
place where they are to that other and 
holy place where they are not, and whose contours are defined 
not by geography but by religious need. 
  Islam, in other words, is less a theological doctrine than a 
system of piety. To submit to it is to discover the rules for an 
untroubled life and an easy conscience. Moreover, rooted in 
the ritual and taking constant nourishment from it is a system 
of morality that clarifies those matters which must be clari-
fied if people are to live with each 
other in peace. It is a system that 
safeguards the family as the primary 
object of loyalty and trust; that clari-
fies and disciplines sexual conduct; 
that sanctifies ordinary obligations 
of friendship and kinship; and that 
lays down rules for business which 
have a power to exonerate as well 
as to blame. Even if this morality, 
like the rituals that feed it, threatens 
those freedoms which Westerners 
take for granted and which the rising 
generation of Muslim immigrants 
wish to exploit, it has the singular 
advantage of clarity. It tells the faith-
ful what they must do in order to be 
on good terms with God; and what 
they must do is entirely a matter of 
private life, ritual, and worship. The 
public sphere can be left to look after 
itself.14
  In the context of Western ano-
mie and self-indulgence, therefore, 
Muslim immigrants cling to their faith, seeing it as something 
superior to the surrounding moral chaos, and therefore more 
worthy of obedience than the secular law which permits so 
much sin. Their children may rebel for a while against the 
strict sexual codes and patriarchal absolutes of the Muslim 
family; but they too, in any crisis, are drawn to their ancestral 
faith, which offers a vision of moral security they find nowhere 
in the public space that Western political systems have devoted 
themselves to generating. 
  The writ of holy law runs through all things, but this does not 
mean that Islamic societies have been governed solely by the 
shari‘a. On the contrary, in almost all respects relevant to the 
government of a large society, the shari‘a is radically deficient. 
It has therefore been necessary in every epoch for the ruler 
to lay down laws of his own which will guarantee his power, 
facilitate administration, and permit the collection of taxes. 
But these laws have no independent legitimacy in the eyes of 
those compelled to obey them. They do not create a space out-
side religion in which freedom is the norm. On the contrary, 
they merely add to the constraints of the holy law the rules of 
a political order which is backed by no de jure authority, only 
by de facto power. In any upheaval they are rejected entirely 
as the arbitrary edicts of a usurper. 
Hence, there is no scope in a tradi-
tional Islamic society for the kinds of 
purely political development, through 
the patient building of institutions and 
secular laws, that we know in the West. 
Change, when it comes, takes the form 
of a crisis, as power is challenged from below in the name of 
the one true Power above. 
  If the only way in which a law can be legitimated is by deriv-
ing it from a command of God, then clearly all secular laws are 
seen as mere expedients adopted by the ruler. In such circum-
stances it is unlikely that any kind of constitutional, represen-
tative, or democratic government will emerge. Although the 
Ottoman Empire attempted reforms 
that would give legitimacy to its cen-
tralized administration, these reforms 
—which led first to the destruction of 
the Empire, and then to the emer-
gence of the modern Turkish state 
under Mustafah Kemal Atatürk—were 
explicitly “Westernizing,” involving 
both a deliberate move away from 
Islamic ideas of legitimacy, and a 
ruthless secularization of society, 
with the ‘ulama’ losing whatever 
power they had once possessed in the 
educational, legal, and administrative 
process. 
  The Westernizing of Turkey was 
made possible by its imperial his-
tory, which had imposed the obliga-
tion to govern distant provinces and 
recalcitrant tribes by a system of law 
which could only here and there be 
justified by some divine genealogy, 
and which was therefore constantly 
seeking legitimacy of another kind. 
By remaking Turkey as a territorial rather than an imperial 
power, and by simultaneously secularizing and Turkifying the 
Ottoman culture, Atatürk created a national loyalty, a territo-
rial jurisdiction, and a form of constitutional government. As a 
consequence, Turkey has been the only durable democracy in 
the Muslim world—although a democracy maintained as such 
by frequent interventions by an army loyal to the Kemalist 
project. This transition has not been without cost, however. 
Modern Turkey has been effectively severed from its past. In 
the ensuing search for a modern identity, young people are 
repeatedly attracted to radical and destabilizing ideologies, 
both Islamist and utopian.
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  This search for identity takes another but related form in 
the Arabic-speaking countries, and the al-Qa‘eda organiza-
tion should be understood as one significant result of it.15 
Of course, terrorism of the al- Qa‘eda kind is an abnormality, 
repudiated by the majority of Muslims. It would be the greatest 
injustice to confuse Islam, as a pious way of life, with contem-
porary Islamism, which is an example of what Burke, writing 
of the French Revolutionaries, called an “armed doctrine”—a 
belligerent ideology bent on eradicating all opposition to its 
claims. Nevertheless, Islamism is not an accidental product of 
the crisis that Islam is currently 
undergoing, and the fundamental 
tenets of the faith must be borne 
in mind by those who wish to 
understand the terrorist move-
ments.16 
  Al-Qa‘eda is the personal cre-
ation of Osama bin Laden, but 
it derives from three pre-exist-
ing sociopolitical forces: the 
Wahhabite movement in Saudi 
Arabia; the Muslim Brotherhood 
that emerged in modern Egypt; 
and, finally, the technological 
education now available to disaffected Muslims throughout 
the Middle East. 
  The Wahhabite movement has its roots in the sect (madhhab) 
founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855), whose collection of 
30,000 hadiths formed the basis of the Hanbali fiqh. The lead-
ing principle of Hanbali jurisprudence is that law should not 
be formalized in rules or maxims but constantly derived afresh 
from the original sources by an effort of ijtihad that renews 
both the faith and the understanding of the judge. Hence, 
Muslims must be constantly returned to the Koran and the 
words of the Prophet, the authority of which cannot be over-
ridden by political decrees or formal 
legal systems. Although Hanbalism 
has always been recognized as a legiti-
mate school of fiqh, its uncompromis-
ing emphasis on the origins of the 
Muslim faith has made it a permanent 
source of opposition to the established 
powers in Muslim countries. 
  Hence, when Muhammad ibn ‘Abd 
al- Wahhab (1691–1765), a native of 
central Arabia, sought to restore the 
true faith to the Prophet’s sacred territory, he expressed him-
self in Hanbali terms. The aim was to return from the corrupt 
practices that flourished under the Ottoman Empire and its 
factititous rules and offices to the original teachings of the 
Prophet and his Companions. Compelled to seek asylum in 
Deraiah, al-Wahhab attracted the local chieftain, Muhammad 
ibn Sa‘ud, to his cause. And it was Ibn Sa‘ud’s grandson who, 
with a fanatical and puritanical following, “liberated” Mecca 
from the idolatrous practices that had rooted themselves there, 
establishing at the same time a short-lived kingdom in Arabia, 
and thereafter paying for his presumption with his life. 
  Despite this political failure, Wahhabism took root in the 
Arabian peninsula. The Wahhabis preached purity of lifestyle 
and absolute obedience to the Koran, free from all compro-
mise with the dar al-harb. They rejected the official schools 
of fiqh, including the Hanbali madhhab that had inspired 
their founder, and argued that whoever can read the Koran 
can judge for himself in matters of doctrine. After the death 
of the Companions, therefore, no new consensus (ijma‘) could 
be admitted. 
  In the early twentieth century a group of Wahhabis gathered 
around a descendent of the original Ibn Sa‘ud to form a broth-
erhood (ikhwan) dedicated to the re-establishment of a puri-
fied faith by jihad. Starting out with a handful of followers in 
1902, ibn Sa‘ud, as the world now 
knows him, gradually drove the 
Turkish clients from their paper 
thrones in the Arabian peninsula. 
By the time that the Ottoman 
Empire collapsed, ibn Sa‘ud was 
able to declare a kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia in the peninsula, 
and for a brief while the ikhwan 
exerted their influence over the 
holy places, causing widespread 
alarm in the region. However Ibn 
Sa‘ud, now a player on the stage 
of international politics, came to 
see that he must negotiate with the British for the secure pos-
session of his kingdom, and that the suppression of his follow-
ing would be a necessary price. 
  Although the ikhwan were brought to heel, many of them 
through absorption into the Saudi National Guard, they did 
not forget their original intention, which was to engage in a 
jihad against the infidel. Nor did they forget that this aim had 
been diverted in the interests of a secular power. Instead of 
returning the sacred places to God, they had handed them over 
to an earthly sovereign, and one who had the impertinence, 
moreover, to name this holy territory for himself. It has never 
been forgotten by the puritan ‘ulama’ 
of Saudi Arabia, therefore, that the 
spiritual legacy of Wahhabism has 
been betrayed by the family that pur-
ported to fight for it.
  The other important Islamic move-
ment in the formation of al-Qa‘eda 
was also an ikhwan. The Muslim 
Brotherhood was founded in Egypt 
in 1928 by Hassan al- Banna, then 
a twenty-two-year-old elementary 
school teacher in Ismailia, a featureless new town controlled 
by the Franco-British Suez Canal Company. Surrounded on all 
sides by the signs and symbols of the infidel way of life, living 
under a jurisdiction that had lost authority in Muslim eyes 
and which stood idly by as the Muslim way of life decayed, 
al-Banna, who had received a rigorous Islamic education and 
had already acquired a reputation for piety, responded to 
the appeals of his contemporaries to found a movement that 
would bring faith, hope, and charity to the rural migrants who 
were crowding into the shanty towns around the cities. For 
al-Banna, however, charity was an insufficient proof of faith: 
a jihad was also needed, which would expel the infidel from 
Muslim soil. Islamic clubs and discussion groups abounded 
in the Egypt of the time, but the Brotherhood was to be dif-
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ferent—a return to the militant Islam of the Prophet, the goal 
of which would be to re-establish the reign of purity and piety 
that the Prophet had created in Medina. 
  Hassan al-Banna was profoundly influenced by the Wahhabite 
movement. The conquest of the Holy Places was a triumphant 
proof of what could be achieved by faith, ‘asabiya, and vio-
lence. Within a decade the Brotherhood had become the best 
organized indigenous political force in Egypt. Its anti-British 
sentiment caused it to look to the Axis powers in World War 
II, hoping for the liberation of Egypt and its own seizure of 
power thereafter. After the Allied victory, it confined itself to 
a campaign of terrorism, through which 
to “bear witness” to Islamic truth against 
the infidel.
  This campaign was to provide the model 
for future Islamist movements in Iran 
and Lebanon. Cinemas were blown up, 
along with the haunts of the “infidels and 
heretics,” while women wearing “inad-
equate dress” were attacked with knives. 
Prominent public figures were tried by the Brotherhood in 
absentia and found guilty of “causing corruption on earth”: 
their deaths followed as a matter of course. Two prime minis-
ters and many other officials were murdered in this way. Young 
Muslims from elsewhere in the Middle East were recruited to 
the Brotherhood, which operated in secret, al-Banna denying 
all involvement in terrorism until his arrest and execution in 
1949. By this time the Brotherhood had trained over a hundred 
terrorists from other Islamic countries, who traveled to their 
homelands to initiate the same kind of destabilizing mayhem 
that had brought chaos to Egypt. This unrest facilitated the 
army coup which led to the destruction of Egypt’s fragile mon-
archy and the assumption of power by Gamal Abdul-Nasir (or 
Nasser, as he is generally known in the West).
  The Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed and savagely repressed 
by Nasser. But it lived on as a secret 
society, proliferating through cells 
formed to study the letters sent 
from prison by its new leading 
personality, Sayyed Qutb (1906–
66), who had lived in the United 
States from 1949 until 1951, and 
who preached the impossibility of 
compromise between Islam and 
the world of ignorance (jahiliyya). 
Qutb was a selfconscious intel-
lectual in the Western sense, who attempted to give Islam a 
decidedly modernist, even “existentialist” character. The faith 
of the true Muslim was, for Qutb, an expression of his inner-
most being against the inauthentic otherness of the surround-
ing world.17 Islam was therefore the answer to the rootlessness 
and comfortlessness of modernity, and Qutb did not stop short 
of endorsing both suicide and terrorism as instruments in the 
self-affirmation of the believer against the jahiliyya. In place of 
the credo quia absurdum of Tertullian he preached the facio 
quia absurdum (I do it because it is absurd) of the existential-
ist, believing that this absurdity would also be a triumph of the 
spirit over the surrounding pagan culture. 
  Qutb and hundreds of his followers were executed by Nasser 
in 1966, but not before their message had spread through 
a younger generation that was enjoying for the first time a 
Western-style university education and the excitement of glob-
al communications. Although Sadat and his successor, Hosni-
Mubarak, have tried to accommodate the Brotherhood by 
permitting it to reorganize as a political party, with a share in 
power accorded to its official leaders, the real movement con-
tinued independently, not as a form of politics, but as a form of 
membership, whose “brothers” would one day be martyrs. 
  Many of the ideological leaders of the Egyptian Islamist move-
ment have been, like Mohammed Atta, graduates in technical 
or scientific subjects. Some have had the 
benefit of postgraduate study in the West. 
Their scientific training opens to them 
the secrets of Western technology while 
at the same time revealing the emptiness 
of a civilization in which only technol-
ogy seems to matter. Although Osama 
bin Laden is a Saudi by birth, his most 
active followers are Egyptians, shaped by 
Western technology and Qutbist Islamism to become weapons 
in the fight to the death against technology. Al-Qa‘eda offers 
them a new way of life which is also a way of death—an Islamist 
equivalent of the “being-towards-death” extolled by Heidegger, 
in which all external loyalties are dissolved in an act of self-sac-
rificial commitment.
  Al-Qa‘eda appeals to North African Muslims partly because 
it is an Arabist organization, expressing itself in the language 
and imagery of the Koran and pursuing a conflict that has its 
roots in the land of the Prophet. It has given to the Sunni and 
Arab branch of Islamism the same sense of identity that the 
Shi‘ite and Persian branch received from the Islamic Republic 
of Ayatollah Khomeini. Indeed, its vision is virtually indis-
tinguishable from that of Khomeini, who once described the 
killing of Western corrupters as a “surgical operation” com-
manded by God himself.  
  Khomeini’s sentiments do not 
merely reflect his reading of the 
Koran. They are the fruit of a long 
exile in the West, where he was 
protected by the infidels whose 
destruction he conjures. They are 
a vivid testimony to the fact that 
the virtues of Western political 
systems are, to a certain kind of 
Islamic mind, imperceptible—or 
perceptible, as they were to Qutb and Atta, only as hideous 
moral failings. Even while enjoying the peace and freedom 
that issue from a secular rule of law, a person who regards 
the shari‘a as the unique path to salvation may see these 
things only as the signs of a spiritual emptiness or corrup-
tion. For someone like Khomeini—a figure of great historic 
importance—human rights and secular government display 
the decadence of Western civilization, which has failed to arm 
itself against those who intend to destroy it. The message is 
that there can be no compromise, and systems that make com-
promise and conciliation into their ruling principles are merely 
aspects of the Devil’s work. 
  Islam originally spread through the world on the wings of 
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military success. Conquest, victory, and triumph over enemies 
are a continual refrain of the Koran, offered as proof that God 
is on the side of the believers. The Shi‘ites are remarkable 
among Muslims, however, in commemorating, as the central 
episode in their cult, a military defeat. To some extent they 
share the Christian vision of divinity as proved not through 
worldly triumph but through the willing acceptance of failure. 
Like Christians, Shi‘ites take comfort in an eschatology of 
redemption, looking forward to the return of the Hidden Imam 
in the way that many Christians anticipate the Second Coming 
of Christ. 
  Hussein Ibn ‘Ali, whom the Shi‘ites recognize as their third 
Imam, was killed, together with his followers, by the armies 
of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid at the battle of Karbala in 680. 
Hussein was, for his followers, a symbol of all that is pure, 
innocent, and good in the Islamic way of life, and Yazid a proof 
that the community formed by the Prophet had fallen into the 
hands of corrupt and evil usurpers. By each year lamenting 
the defeat of Hussein, in rituals that may extend to excesses 
of self-inflicted injury, the Shi‘ites rehearse their conviction 
that Islam must be constantly returned to its original purity, 
and that the powers that prevail in the world will always seek 
to corrupt it. At the same time Shi‘ites 
internalize the goal of self-sacrificial 
death as the final proof of merit. This 
last feature became immensely impor-
tant in the war against Iraq, which 
succeeded the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran. Following in the tradition of the 
assassins, Khomeini issued a new call 
to martyrdom, which was taken up by 
children and teenagers who expended 
their lives in clearing minefields. 
  The example set by the followers of Khomeini was soon pro-
jected around the world. Sunni Muslims, who believe on the 
authority of the Koran that suicide is categorically forbidden, 
have nevertheless been sucked into the Shi‘ite maelstrom to 
become martyrs in the war against Satan. The cult of death 
seems to make sense of a world in which evil prevails; more-
over it gives unprecedented power to the martyr, who no 
longer has anything to fear. The cult is both a protest against 
modern nihilism and a form of it—a last-ditch attempt to res-
cue Islam from the abyss of nothingness by showing that it can 
still demand the ultimate proof of devotion. 
  And the attempt seems to have succeeded. It is not too great 
an exaggeration to say that this new confluence of Sunni 
orthodoxy and Shi‘ite extremism has laid the foundations for a 
worldwide Islamic revival. For the first time in centuries Islam 
appears, both in the eyes of its followers and in the eyes of 
the infidel, to be a single religious movement united around a 
single goal. Nor is it an exaggeration to suggest that one major 
factor in producing this unwonted unity is Western civilization 
and the process of globalization which it has set in motion. In 
the days when East was East and West was West it was possible 
for Muslims to devote their lives to pious observances and to 
ignore the evil that prevailed in the dar al-harb. But when that 
evil spreads around the globe, cheerfully offering freedoms and 
permissions in place of the austere requirements of a religious 
code, so that the dar al-islam is invaded by it, old antagonisms 
are awakened. This is what the West now faces. 
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Initially, Bill O’Reilly’s new book may give the disconcerting impression that the notoriously prickly pundit 
has turned into a softie. In the introduc-
tion, the author blatantly butters up his 
readers. “If you have started this book, 
the chances are you’re an independent 
type,” he writes. “The everyday American 
who understands what The Factor con-
cept is all about is generally a person 
who wants to live life honestly and make 
his or her own way. That person is often 
responsible, generous, aware that others 
around them also have lives to live, and 
unabashedly patriotic. You, very likely, 
are one of those people.” 
After this prudish flattery, O’Reilly 
boasts about the incredibly high ratings 
of his show. The sheer momentum of 
its popularity overcame the elite media 
“eggheads” who were plotting the pro-
gram’s demise – “The American people 
had made the O’Reilly Factor a power-
ful entity,” the author writes, and then 
brags about the acclaim he has received 
from the American Television Critics 
Association and Industry Magazine 
Television Week.
  After fawning over himself and his 
minions of fans, O’Reilly decides to 
enlighten the masses with pieces of wis-
dom gathered during the course of his 
life. Some are remarkably perceptive. 
A great many, however, are profoundly 
redundant: “You must learn to become 
a problem solver, not a problem cre-
ator.” Worn out pieces of advice – such 
as the importance of “defining your 
life, and not letting others define it for 
you” – may lead the reader to think 
the book is just another run-of-the-mill 
self-help guide with a political twist. 
Luckily, O’Reilly’s pointed wit outshines 
the book’s numerous clichés.
  And don’t worry – you won’t find 
Who’s Looking Out For You? in the 
‘personal growth’ section of the book 
store. Even the most tired platitudes 
are interpreted with an original, level-
headed abrasiveness that only O’Reilly 
can provide. Unlike the legions of ‘psy-
chobabble’ gurus, O’Reilly admits that it 
is impossible to entirely clear your life of 
problems. Especially if they are serious. 
“If you’re going to drink a quart of bour-
bon a day or smoke crack, this book is 
not going to help you,” writes O’Reilly. 
  Even those of us who aren’t drug 
addicts are also faced with constant 
hurdles. However, the author doesn’t 
think we must hide from these difficul-
ties. They are to be expected.    
  “Problems are the reason humans are 
at the top of the food chain…Our ances-
tors, the primates, lived a marginal exis-
tence until a giant animal ate them. 
Then we evolved and learned to stick a 
fiery torch in the giant animal’s face.”
The problems confronting the human 
species are currently much more com-
plex than killing predatory animals, but 
the basic logic remains the same: we 
must use our intellect to ensure survival. 
Rationality must allow us to understand 
the forces working in our favor, as well 
as the forces working against us – this is 
the guiding principle in Who’s Looking 
Out For You? The ultimate skill, O’Reilly 
says, is “the ability to determine who 
cares about you as a person and who 
doesn’t.” 
  The book includes anecdotes of the 
author’s own achievements and humili-
ations, both as working-class kid, an 
investigative reporter, and a news 
anchorman. While the title of the book 
may be Who’s Looking Out For You?, 
the author concentrates mostly on 
whom you cannot trust. (Just about 
everybody.) O’Reilly mentions some of 
his own private betrayals, but is discreet 
enough not to “name names,” as he usu-
ally does about public figures. 
In the most personally revealing por-
tion of the book, however, he goes into 
detail about the unstable relationship he 
had with his father: an accountant who 
despised his dreary dead-end career, but 
kept the position of out of insecurity. He 
often took his frustrations out upon his 
son both physically and mentally; the 
two men had a very tense relationship. 
Upon his deathbed, the elder O’Reilly 
lamented the unfulfilled potential of 
his life. Instead of vilifying his father in 
Who’s Looking Out For You, the author 
say he learned from the man’s regrets. 
Unlike his father, Bill O’Reilly pursued 
his goals fearlessly, and, as he admits, 
somewhat brashly. 
  O’Reilly also concedes that his achieve-
ments as a journalist and broadcaster 
were not founded only upon his talent 
and mental agility, but on his capac-
ity to find worthwhile companions. The 
author offers advice on how to earn and 
retain valuable friends, how to avoid 
“weasels,” and even offers a few tidbits 
of advice about romantic relationships. 
The new book generally has a more per-
sonal tone than the The No Spin Zone 
or The O’Reilly Factor, and it is clear 
that the author wanted to create some-
thing different from his previous works. 
Essentially, though, Whose Looking Out 
For You? is a continuation of O’Reilly’s 
ongoing analysis of the American politi-
BOOKS & ARTS 
Book Review: Who’s Looking Out For You?
Reviewed By Mateusz Perkowski
cal and social system. 
  This isn’t a bad thing. Whether it is on 
the radio, on television, or in print, Bill 
O’Reilly is always doing the same thing: 
cutting through the layers of political cor-
rectness and media hyperbole in order 
to get a glimpse of reality. His scrutiny 
is often unrefined and conservatively 
slanted, but the man honestly wants to 
get to the bottom of things. Unlike many 
other broadcasters,     
O’Reilly is more than just a mouthpiece 
for the Republican party. Many accuse 
him of being an unsophisticated boor 
– but this lack of nuance doesn’t mean 
he is devoid of insight. “Occasionally 
the Irish do know what they’re talking 
about,” writes O’Reilly, poking fun at 
himself. “Just don’t get them at closing 
time.”
  As we have come to expect, O’Reilly is 
generous with biting commentary about 
the government, the media, and all the 
other ‘usual suspects.’ Though he deals 
with problems both great and small, 
his writing isn’t choppy – the author 
seamlessly segues from the troubles of 
individual people to the burdens of the 
country as a whole. More often than 
not, the two are interrelated; as in the 
case of the sycophantic government and 
the decadent consumerism of American 
culture.
  According to O’Reilly, the government 
creates the illusion of ‘looking out for 
you’ through social programs. But this 
superficial compassion amounts to little 
more than throwing money at stagnant 
bureaucracies. According to O’Reilly, the 
system is no longer working effectively; 
“our federal government is not good at 
helping real people who have real prob-
lems, and it doesn’t care about the money 
you give it, as long as that revenue train 
keeps chugging along.” 
  The gradual creation of a powerful gov-
ernment opposes the basic philosophy of 
the United States, which ensures freedom 
from overly central control. According to 
the author, “corruption, incompetence 
and political correctness have spread 
like the Ebola virus throughout our fed-
eral system.” The government ‘for the 
people, by the people’ has become a 
bureaucracy designed to pander to the 
interests of lobbyists and campaign con-
tributors. This image of government-for-
sale has a subversive effect on tradition-
ally American concepts like self-reliance 
and independence. O’Reilly recalls the 
old American spirit, which Theodore 
Roosevelt embodied in a single sentence: 
“Pray not for lighter burdens, but for 
stronger backs.” Unfortunately, this spir-
it is gradually eroding; in O’Reilly’s view, 
the underlying problem in the United 
States is an obsession with consumption 
and gratification – “an intense quest for 
self-satisfaction.” 
  As if scolding the American public 
weren’t enough, the author acknowledg-
es President George W. Bush is a “child 
of privilege” who “brings a sense of enti-
tlement to his job.” Unless it involves 
his fans, O’Reilly is obviously terrible 
at kissing butt. The criticism is spread 
all around. Aside from the obvious tar-
gets, such as President Clinton and dis-
honest corporate executives, the author 
also reproves such conservative-friendly 
characters as John Ashcroft and Pope 
John Paul II for their failures in leader-
ship. His blunt words may not land him 
any invitations to White House dinners, 
but Bill O’Reilly’s observations are rarely 
off-mark. 
  The author’s characteristically self-
conscious arrogance pervades Whose 
Looking Out For You? This may put off 
many people, but it will probably charm 
just as many. Bill O’Reilly hasn’t made a 
name for himself for being humble, but 
he does not presume to be omniscient. 
“Sometimes I’m wrong,” he writes, 
“Sometimes, I even admit it.” The book 
isn’t a piece of timeless literature, not 
does it purport to be – nonetheless, the 
personable common sense offered in its 
pages is well-written and presented in 
an entertaining context. Whose Looking 
Out For You? may never define American 
culture or steer the future of foreign poli-
cy, but it does one thing remarkably well: 
it manages to combine easy readability 
with honest, intellectual analysis.
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“His message is that Bush 
is out of control.”
Howard Dean for America! 
or else!
